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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause prohibits the
government from establishing, endorsing, or favoring a religion.1 The
Establishment Clause’s most fundamental principle is government
neutrality towards religion.2 This principle of neutrality “is not merely
a prohibition against the government’s differentiation among religious
sects,” denomination, or beliefs.3 The principle of neutrality also
requires that the government not prefer religion in general over
nonreligion.4 By remaining neutral towards religion, the government
is, however, not prohibited from accommodating religious practices—
that is, exempting individuals and entities from government-imposed
* J.D. candidate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; Notes & Comments Editor, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW, 2014–15;
MPA, University of Illinois at Chicago; B.A., Political Science, Elmhurst College.
1
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2
Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 709 (2005).
3
Id. at 709-10.
4
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
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regulations that burden the free exercise of religion.5 Religious
accommodations, the United States Supreme Court has explained, are
not inherently incompatible with the neutrality principle, as they seek
neither to neither advance nor inhibit religion, but simply to “permit
religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without
interference.”6 Indeed, “in order to guard against governmental
intrusion into the religious lives of citizens,”7 the principle of
neutrality may even require that the government accommodate
religion.8 Notwithstanding the permissibility of religious
accommodation, when the government accommodates religion, it must
do so in a way that does not “devolve into an unlawful fostering of
religion,”9 as that would run afoul of the neutrality principle and
violate the Establishment Clause.
In Center for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Circuit Court Clerk, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed
Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization Statute’s compliance with the
neutrality principle.10 The State of Indiana recognizes a marriage only
after a state-authorized individual conducts a marriage ceremony and
performs certain duties imposed by the state.11 This is known as
marriage solemnization and its effect is to create a legally recognized

5

Scott E. Williams, Religious Exemptions and the Limits of Neutrality, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 119, 120 (1995); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
6
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 710; Amos, 483 U.S. at 334.
7
Williams, supra note 5, at 119.
8
Id.; Amos, 483 U.S. at 334.
9
Amos, 483 U.S. at 334-35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
10
758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014).
11
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-11-4-3, 16 (West 2014). For instance, the stateauthorized individual must, within thirty days after the date of the marriage, file the
marriage license the couple had to obtained prior to the marriage “with the clerk of
the circuit court who issued” it. Id. at § 16 (a)(3).
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civil marriage.12 Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization Statute, aside from
authorizing certain government officials to solemnize a civil marriage,
conferred the authority to legalize a marriage—that is, solemnization
authority—upon certain religious groups as well as upon members of
the clergy,13 as a form of religious accommodation. According to the
State of Indiana, the Solemnization Statute accommodated members of
the clergy who generally perform marriages under the commandments
of their faiths as well as those religions that regard marriage as a
fundamental tenet.14 As a result, the marriage ceremonies of the
accommodated religions under the Solemnization Statute resulted in
the solemnization of a marriage, that is, a legal marriage.15 The
marriage ceremonies of those religions not accommodated under the
Statute, in contrast, could not result in a legally valid marriage.16
Therefore, the couple wishing to get married, in addition to having a
religious ceremony had to appear before an individual with
solemnization authority to have their marriage solemnized.17 While
members of the religions not included in the Solemnization Statute
could still have their marriages solemnized, the Statute was an
impediment to the members of those religions to have their marriage
solemnized in ceremonies conducted by officials who share their
fundamental beliefs, values, and traditions.18
12

See Andrew C. Stevens, By the Power Vested in Me? Licensing Religious
Officials to Solemnize Marriage in the Age of Same-Sex Marriage, 63 EMORY L.J.
979, 981 (2014).
13
IND. CODE § 31-11-6-1 held unconstitutional by Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758
F.3d 869.
14
Brief of Appellees-Defendants – Supplemental Appendix, Ctr. for Inquiry,
Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751), 2013 WL
663844, at *22-23.
15
Provided that the religious official presiding over the ceremony complied
with the requirements the state imposed on him. IND. CODE § 31-11-4-16.
16
See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872-73.
17
Brief of Appellants-Plaintiffs – Short Appendix at 10, Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc.
v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751); Ctr. for
Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
18
See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
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Had Indiana’s Solemnization Statute in Center for Inquiry been
challenged by one of the religions not accommodated under the
Statute, the question of whether the Statute complied with the
neutrality principle would have been a straightforward one for the
Seventh Circuit. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “the
clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious
denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”19 A
religious accommodation thus violates the Establishment Clause if it
“singles out a particular religious sect [or sects]” for the
accommodation without a proper justification.20 The Solemnization
Statute’s preference for certain religious creeds was immediately
apparent. The Statute preferred religions in which members of the
clergy perform the marriage ceremonies over religions in which nonclergy leaders conduct the marriage ceremonies.21 It also preferred
religions that accord marriage a sacred status over religions that,
although not attaching a sacred status to marriage, still celebrate
marriage.22 Further, the Statute’s preference for certain religions was
unwarranted as the value that it each religion attaches to marriage
cannot be a proper justification for the differential treatment.23 The
19

Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714
(1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
20
Id. at 706; Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005); see infra note 23.
21
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 874.
22
Id. Buddhists, for example, could not have their marriage solemnized in their
religious ceremonies as Buddhism does not have members of the clergy and the
Statute did not identify Buddhism as an accommodated religion. See id.
23
The neutrality principle does not require that a religious accommodation be
indiscriminately conferred upon all religions. For example, the neutrality principle
does not require that an accommodation for observance of the Sabbath Day be
extended to all religions as not all religions observe the Sabbath Day. However,
whereas here, different religions share a practice—marriage—an accommodation
may not be extended to some religions and not to others based on the value that each
religion attaches to marriage. See generally Fowler v. R.I., 345 U.S. 67, 69-70
(1953); Grumet, 512 U.S. at 715-16 (the government may not penalize or
discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views the
government does not regard as valuable or desirable). Accordingly, the analysis of
this Note proceeds from the understanding that marriage is a practice shared by
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challenge to the Solemnization Statute, however, was brought by
Center for Inquiry, Inc. (“CFI”), a non-religious, secular entity which
promotes ethical living without a belief in a Supreme Being and which
teaches a set of human values “upon which its members are to base
their lives, actions, relationships and decisions.”24 The system of
beliefs of CFI is generally known as “secular humanism” and its main
“commitment [is] to improve human welfare in the world.”25 Like
religious organizations, CFI celebrates important life events, including
marriages.26 CFI’s marriage ceremonies are designed to represent and
celebrate CFI’s values and philosophies.27 Given, however, that the
Solemnization Statute did not extend the authority to solemnize a
marriage to CFI, its marriage ceremonies, just as those of the religions
not accommodated under the Statute, could not result in a legal
marriage.28 Thus, in Center for Inquiry, the Seventh Circuit faced the
more difficult question of whether Indiana’s Solemnization Statute ran
afoul of the neutrality principle by failing to confer solemnization
authority upon CFI.
In holding that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the
neutrality principle by failing to extend the authority to solemnize a
marriage to CFI, the Seventh Circuit had to address two main issues.
First, the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether CFI’s beliefs
qualified as “religious” for purposes of the First Amendment. Second,
the Seventh Circuit had to address the well-accepted premise that
states may, consistent with the neutrality principle, accommodate
religious groups without having to extend similar accommodations to
secular entities.29 In addressing these questions, the Seventh Circuit
various religions and from the premise that the value each religion attaches to
marriage cannot be a proper justification for conferring solemnization authority only
upon some religions.
24
Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 5-6.
25
Id. at 6 (citations omitted).
26
Id. at 9.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 10.
29
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).
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had guidance from its own as well as Supreme Court precedent, but no
conclusive answers. This Note posits that, in concluding that CFI’s
beliefs were the equivalent of religion, the Seventh Circuit properly
employed a broad definition of religion, which has strong roots in
Supreme Court’s and Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence. This Note also
defends the Seventh Circuit’s omission of Supreme Court precedent
that arguably supports a narrower definition of religion as even a
reference to such precedent would have caused confusion as to what is
generally regarded as the proper test for ascertaining what qualifies as
a religion for purposes of First Amendment analysis. Moreover, the
application of a narrower definition of religion would have threatened
to leave many of the rich and diverse beliefs Americans see as their
“religion” without protections under the First Amendment. Lastly, this
Note discusses Supreme Court precedent not addressed by the Seventh
Circuit that appeared to support Indiana’s contention that it was not
obliged to include CFI in the Solemnization Statute to comply with the
neutrality principle. This Note explains that such a precedent did not
require a different result.
I. NEUTRALITY AND RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS
A.

The Neutrality Principle

The First Amendment’s Establishment Clause states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion.”30 The “touchstone” of the Establishment Clause is “the
principle that the First Amendment mandates government neutrality
between religion and religion, and between religion and
nonreligion.”31 This principle, known as the neutrality principle,
prohibits the government from treating people differently “based on

30

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); Everson v. Bd. of Ed. of Ewing Twp.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
31
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the Gods or gods they worship, or do not worship.”32 There are two
fundamental dimensions to the neutrality principle.33 First, neutrality
requires that the government “neither favor nor disfavor religion in
general, as compared to nonreligion.”34 Consistent with this
requirement, the government may not “pass laws or impose
requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers.”35
Likewise, the government may not “act[ ] with the ostensible and
predominant purpose of advancing [or inhibiting] religion” as there is
“no neutrality when the government’s ostensible object is to take
sides.”36 Second, the neutrality principle requires the government to
treat religions equally, unless there is a secular justification for
differential treatment.37 In its Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the
Supreme Court has explained that the “clearest command of the
Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”38

32

Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 714

(1994).
33

Dhananjai Shivakumar, Neutrality and the Religion Clauses, 33 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 505, 515 (1998); Daniel O. Conkle, The Path of American Religious
Liberty: From the Original Theology to Formal Neutrality and an Uncertain Future,
75 IND. L.J. 1, 8 (2000).
34
Conkle, supra note 33, at 8.
35
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961); Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333,
356 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that the government, “having chosen to
exempt . . . cannot draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious beliefs on
the one hand and secular beliefs on the other”).
36
McCreary Cnty., Ky, 545 U.S. at 860.
37
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 714.
38
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted); Gillette v. U.S.,
401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (“An attack founded on disparate treatment of ‘religious’
claims invokes what is perhaps the central purpose of the Establishment Clause–the
purpose of ensuring government neutrality in matters of religion.”).
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Religious Accommodations

The neutrality principle, however, does not forbid the government
from accommodating religion.39 The Supreme Court “has long
recognized that the government may (and sometimes must)
accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without
violating the Establishment Clause.”40 When the government
accommodates a religious practice, it exempts a religious person or
entity from government-imposed regulatory requirements that burden
that person’s or entity’s exercise of religion.41 The government may,
for instance, on the basis of religion, exempt individuals from
participating in war;42 allow non-for-profit religious organizations to
discriminate in certain employment practices;43 permit prison inmates
to form religious study groups;44 grant property tax exemptions to
religious entities;45 and allow religious organizations to solemnize
their own marriages.46 At first sight, such accommodations may appear
to run afoul of the neutrality principle as they may be seen as a
government-conferred benefit on the religious, in the form of an
exemption from compliance with a law.47 Religious accommodations,
39

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005); Corp. of Presiding Bishop
of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35
(1987); Amos, 483 U.S. 327 at 348 (O’Connor, J., concurring); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 422 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
40
Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (internal quotations marks omitted) (citations
omitted); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45
(1987).
41
Amos, 483 U.S. at 338; Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of
Religion: An Update and a Response to the Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 685, 686
(1992).
42
Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333 (1970); U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
43
Amos, 483 U.S. at 329-30.
44
Cutter, 544 U.S. 709; Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir.
2005).
45
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
46
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014).
47
This Note does not address the controversy surrounding religious
accommodations. For a discussion see Robin Fretwell Wilson, The Calculus of

39
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however, are not incompatible with the neutrality principle because
their inherent objective is not to “advance[ ] religion nor . . . [to]
inhibit[ ]” it,48 but simply to “lift[ ] a [government-placed] regulation
that burdens the exercise of religion.”49
Supreme Court jurisprudence explains the manner in which
religious accommodations fit into the concept of neutrality. Together,
the Religious Clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution
provide that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”50 The first clause,
the Establishment Clause, prohibits the government from establishing,
preferring, or endorsing a religion. The second clause, the Free
Exercise Clause, prohibits the government from interfering with the
practice of religious beliefs. The two clauses are in tension51 and “if
expanded to a logical extreme, [each] would tend to clash with the
other.”52 For example, “limits on governmental action that might make
sense as a way to avoid establishment could . . . [nevertheless] limit
freedom” of religion if governmental action is necessary to allow the

Accommodation: Contraception, Abortion, Same-Sex Marriage, and Other Clashes
Between Religion and the State, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1417 (2012); Steven G. Gey, Why Is
Religion Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75 (1990); McConnell,
supra note 41, at 685-742; Frederick Mark Gedicks, An Unfirm Foundation: The
Regrettable Indefensibility of Religious Exemptions, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J.
555 (1998).
48
Walz, 397 U.S. at 672.
49
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
50
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
51
McCreary Cnty., Ky. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (explaining
by way of illustration how “[t]he two clauses compete: spending government money
on the clergy looks like establishing religion, but if the government cannot pay for
military chaplains a good many soldiers and sailors would be kept from the
opportunity to exercise their chosen religions”) (citations omitted). For a discussion
that the clauses do not conflict, see Carl H. Esbeck, When Accommodations for
Religion Violate the Establishment Clause: Regularizing the Supreme Court’s
Analysis, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 359, 362-65 (2007).
52
Walz, 397 U.S. at 668-69.
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free exercise thereof.53 However, the Supreme Court has explained
that in between the “joints”54 of the Religious Clauses “there is
[ample] room for play,” 55 which “permit[s] religious exercise to exist
without sponsorship and without interference.”56 That is to say, in
between the Religious Clauses, there is “corridor”57 or “space . . .
neither compelled by the Free Exercise Clause nor prohibited by the
Establishment Clause,”58 in which the government may act to
accommodate religious beliefs. When the government acts within that
corridor, it operates with “benevolent neutrality,”59 which is tolerable
and even desirable under the Establishment Clause.
In accommodating religion, the government does not, however,
have carte blanche to accommodate religious individuals and entities
to its liking. To the contrary, the government must ensure that religious
accommodations do not “devolve into unlawful fostering”60 of religion
in general or of a particular religious sect or denomination. At that
point, the accommodation would no longer be benevolently neutral,
but would violate the requirements of the neutrality principle and
result in an impermissible establishment of religion.61 This was the
precise issue the Seventh Circuit faced in Center for Inquiry. There,
the court had to decide whether Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization
Statute crossed the boundaries of benevolent neutrality by allowing
only certain religious denominations to solemnize marriages.

53

McCreary Cnty., Ky., 545 U.S. at 875.
Id.
55
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669; Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987).
56
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
57
Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005).
58
Id. at 719.
59
Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
60
Id. at 334-35 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
61
See McConnell, supra note 41, at 686-88.
54

41
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II. STATE REGULATION OF MARRIAGE AND SOLEMNIZATION STATUTES
A.

State Regulation of Marriage

The regulation of marriage is “the province” of the states, rather
than of the federal government.62 Accordingly, the states “prescribe the
conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens
shall be created.”63 While the laws regulating marriage vary across the
states,64 there are certain requisites for a valid marriage that the states
share. Generally, states require individuals wishing to get married to
apply for and obtain a marriage license from a designated government
entity.65 The state’s issuance of the license, itself, does not ordinarily
result in a legally binding marriage.66 In most states, marriage
solemnization is required to create a legally recognized civil
marriage.67 Marriage solemnization refers to a ceremony or a “ritual
by which . . . [two individuals] take on their new status” as husband
and wife.68 As a general rule, the solemnization of the marriage must
be conducted by a state-authorized individual, who also performs
certain duties (such as signing the marriage license) the state has

62

Loving v. Va., 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975); Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
63
Penoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1878); Hill, 125 U.S. at 205 (stating
that state legislatures “prescribe[ ] . . . the procedure or form essential to constitute
marriage”).
64
See Robert E. Rains, Marriage in the Time of Internet Ministers: I Now
Pronounce You Married, but Who Am I to Do So?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV. 809, 842-77
(2010); Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB,
2012 WL 5997721, at *10 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012) rev’d sub nom. by Ctr. for
Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014).
65
Rains, supra note 64, at 838-39. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30 (West
2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.040 (West 2013).
66
Stevens, supra note 12, at 987.
67
Id. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07 (West 2014); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14-2-109 (West 2012); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (West 2014).
68
Rains, supra note 64, at 839.
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imposed on him in order for the marriage to be complete.69 In some
states, it is a crime to solemnize a marriage without the state’s
authority.70
B.

Solemnization Statutes and Religious Accommodations

Typically, states bestow the authority to solemnize a marriage in
their solemnization statutes upon specific individuals or entities.71
Such statutes invariably confer the authority to solemnize a marriage
upon certain government officials, such as judges and justices of the
peace.72 At least thirteen states also permit public notaries,73 the couple
aspiring to get married,74 or any person to solemnize a marriage.75 The
solemnization statutes usually also authorize religious officials to
solemnize marriages.76 The states’ decision to confer solemnization
authority upon religious officials has gone unchallenged throughout
the history of this country.77 Thus, courts have had no opportunity to
address how religious solemnization of a civil marriage fits into the
Religious Clauses and the principle of neutrality. Religious
solemnization of marriages, however, has existed since colonial times
and it, in the present day, may best be described as a permissible

69

Id. at 842-77. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-30; HAW. REV. STAT. § 57213 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 551.7 (West 2014).
70
Stevens, supra note 12, at 987.
71
See Rains, supra note 64, at 842-77. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. ANN. §
25.05.261 (West 2014); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-213 (West 2007); CAL. FAM. CODE
§ 400 (West 2013).
72
Stevens, supra note 12, at 987; supra note 55.
73
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 741.07; S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-20, 26-1-90
(2014).
74
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109; MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1301; 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1502 (West 2014).
75
See, e.g., COLO. § 14-2-109; MONT. § 40-1-301; 23 PA. § 1502; N.Y. §
11(4).
76
Id.
77
Stevens, supra note 12, at 987-88.
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accommodation of religion.78 Indeed, “long before marriage was a
civil institution regulated by . . . [the states], it was a religious contract
and commandment.”79 Given that “marriage as an institution owes its
origins to religious roots, it is both natural and logical that when state
government[s] regulate[ ] entry into marriage, [they] accommodate[ ]”
religious traditions regarding marriage practices.80 In other words,
since the requirement that a state-authorized official solemnize a
marriage before it can be legal may interfere with the religious
practices of individuals to have their marriage solemnized by a
religious official of their faith, the states may justifiably lift such
governmental interference by allowing religious officials to also
solemnize a marriage.
C.

Marriage Procedure in Indiana and the Marriage
Solemnization Statute, Indiana Code §31-11-61

In the State of Indiana, individuals may be legally married only
after obtaining a marriage license and having their marriage
solemnized.81 The individuals aspiring to get married may obtain a
marriage license from the clerk of the circuit court in which any of
them resides or in the circuit in which the marriage will occur.82 The
marriage license includes an original and a duplicate marriage
certificate.83 After securing the marriage license and certificates, the
78

See Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872-74 (7th
Cir. 2014); Woods-Bateman v. Hawai’i, No. CIV.07-00119 HG LEK, 2008 WL
2051671, at *11 (D. Haw. May 13, 2008) (“In providing for the licensing of
individuals to perform religious ceremonies, the State of Hawaii is accommodating
the deeply held beliefs of many of its citizens who prefer the marriage be solemnized
by a leader of their religion.”).
79
Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *32 (citing to Joel A. Nichols,
Misunderstanding Marriage and Missing Religion, 2011 MICH. ST. L. REV. 195, 202
(2011)). See also Stevens, supra note 12, at 984.
80
Id.
81
IND. CODE § 31-11-4-1, 3, 13.
82
Id. § 31–11–4–3.
83
Id. § 31–11–4–15.
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couple to be married “must present . . . [the] license to an individual . .
. authorized” under Indiana’s Solemnization Statute to solemnize a
marriage.84 To solemnize a marriage, the state-authorized individual
presides over a ceremony, in which the couple takes each other as
husband and wife.85 In addition, the state-authorized individual, within
30 days of the ceremony, signs and files the license, along with the
duplicate marriage certificate, with the clerk who issued the license.86
This completes the marriage solemnization process and creates a
legally binding marriage.
Until July 2014, Indiana’s Solemnization Statute vested the
authority to solemnize a marriage in the following individuals and
entities:
(1) A member of the clergy of a religious organization (even
if the cleric does not perform religious functions for an individual
congregation), such as a minister of the gospel, a priest, a bishop,
an archbishop, or a rabbi.
(2) A judge.
(3) A mayor, within the mayor’s county.
(4) A clerk or a clerk-treasurer of a city or town, within a county
in which the city or town is located.
(5) A clerk of the circuit court.
(6) The Friends Church, in accordance with the rules of the
Friends Church.
(7) The German Baptists, in accordance with the rules of their
society.
(8) The Bahai faith, in accordance with the rules of the Bahai
faith.
(9) The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints, in accordance
with the rules of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints.

84

Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB,
2012 WL 5997721, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012).
85
Rains, supra note 64, at 839.
86
IND. CODE § 31–11–4–16.
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(10) An imam of a masjid (mosque), in accordance with the rules
of the religion of Islam.87
Under Indiana’s Solemnization Statute, anyone who solemnized a
marriage ceremony without the authority of the state committed a
Class B misdemeanor.88
III. CENTER FOR INQUIRY, INC. V. MARION CIRCUIT COURT CLERK
On June 11, 2012, the Indiana branch of CFI, sought a temporary
and permanent injunction in the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Indiana “to bar . . . the Clerk of the Marion Circuit
Court . . . and the Marion County Prosecutor . . . from enforcing
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute.”89 CFI asserted, inter alia,90 that the
Solemnization Statute was facially unconstitutional because it created
a preference for religion over nonreligion, in violation of the
Establishment Clause.91 More specifically, CFI contended that the
Solemnization Statute ran afoul of the neutrality principle because it
preferred religion over nonreligion by extending the authority to
solemnize marriages only to certain religious organizations.92

87

Id. § 31–11–6–1.
Id.
89
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *1.
90
In addition to the First Amendment claim, CFI alleged that Indiana’s
Solemnization Statute was unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment because it extended the authority to solemnize a marriage to
religious leader and thus, allowed religious persons to be married by religious
leaders of their choice while denying the same rights to non-religious persons. Id. at
*5 (citations omitted). The Equal Protection claim is beyond the subject of this Note.
The Seventh Circuit addressed the Equal Protection claim only briefly and concluded
that the Solemnization Statute was also unconstitutional under the Equal Protection
Clause because it discriminated arbitrarily among religious and secular ethical
beliefs. Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 875 (7th Cir.
2014).
91
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *5.
92
Id.
88
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Center for Inquiry, Inc. and its Secular Marriage
Celebrations

CFI is an international not-for-profit organization with
approximately 24,000 members93 and nineteen branches in the United
States, including one in Indiana.94 CFI “describes itself as a humanist
group that promotes ethical living without a belief in a deity.”95 Its
mission is to promote a purely secular society based on science96 by
advocating that it is “possible to have strong ethical values based on
critical reason and scientific inquiry rather than theism and faith.”97
Accordingly, CFI rejects blind faith and promotes the use of scientific
methods instead.98 CFI believes that “integrity, trustworthiness,
benevolence, and fairness”99 are the core values of “effective morality
and a model for living a good life.”100 Based on these values, CFI
“maintain[s] and teaches a set of beliefs upon which its members are
to base their lives, actions, relationships and decisions.”101 This system
of beliefs is usually denominated “secular humanism”102and it “play[s]
the same role in . . . [CFI] members’ lives as religious methods and
values play in the lives of adherents.”103
To provide its members with ceremonies that express their
philosophies and values, CFI conducts “secular celebrations.”104 These
93

Id. at * 2.
Center for Inquiry, CFI Branches, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/about/
branches (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
95
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871.
96
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *2 (citations omitted).
97
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871.
98
Center for Inquiry, About Center for Inquiry, http://www.centerforinquiry.
net/ about (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
99
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3 (citations omitted).
100
Id.
101
Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 6.
102
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *2.
103
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871.
104
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3.
94
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secular celebrations usually mark important life events105 such as
funerals, memorials, and marriages.106 Since 2009, when CFI began its
secular celebrations, certified CFI members, also known as secular
celebrants, preside over these ceremonies.107 In Indiana, Reba Boyd
Wooden, a certified secular celebrant and the leader of CFI’s Indiana
branch, conducted marriage ceremonies for CFI members, but was
unable to solemnize their marriages because CFI was not included in
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute.108 Although the Solemnization Statute
vested solemnization authority on members of the clergy, Ms. Wooden
could still not solemnize a marriage, as Indiana does not recognize
CFI’s leaders as clergy because CFI is not a religious organization.109
CFI was, however, unwilling to declare itself a religious organization
and get its leaders clergy credential in order to be able to solemnize
marriages.110And, while in other states, CFI’s leaders may solemnize a
marriage under the title of public notaries,111 Indiana’s Solemnization
Statute also did not confer solemnization authority upon notaries. After
Ms. Wooden was unable to solemnize the marriage of her longtime
friends and mentees,112 Ms.Wooden, her friends and mentees,113 and
CFI challenged the Solemnization Statute on the grounds that it
violated the neutrality principle as it preferred religion over
nonreligion by extending solemnization authority only to religious
105

Center for Inquiry, CFI Secular Program, http://www.centerforinquiry.net/
education/secular_celebrants/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014).
106
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3.
107
Id. at *4.
108
Id. at *3-4.
109
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 872 (7th Cir.
2014).
110
Id. at 871.
111
Center for Inquiry, CFI Celebrant Certification, http://www.centerfor
inquiry. net/education/celebrant_certification/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2014); Ctr. for
Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 871.
112
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 2012 WL 5997721, at *3.
113
In October 2012, while the lawsuit was still pending in the district court,
Ms. Wooden’s friends and mentees had their marriage solemnized by a stateapproved individual and, consequently, withdrew as parties in the lawsuit. Id.
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groups.114 CFI asked that the District Court for the Southern District of
Indiana enter a preliminary and permanent injunction to prevent the
Clerk of the Marion Circuit Court and the Marion County Prosecutor
from enforcing the Statute against them.115
B.

The Decision of the District Court

On November 30, 2012, the district court denied CFI’s request for
injunctive relief and entered judgment in favor of the Clerk of the
Marion Circuit Court and the Marion County Prosecutor.116 In its
opinion, the district court covered constitutional ground that is beyond
the scope of this Note.117 Relevant to the subject of this Note, the court
explained that Indiana could place reasonable regulations on marriage,
designating the procedures by which a marriage becomes legally
effective as well as the persons authorized to solemnize a marriage.118
Given that marriage has deep religious roots, the court explained, it
was “both natural and logical” for Indiana to “accommodate[ ] those
deep religious traditions.”119 The Solemnization Statute, the district
court continued, simply accommodates religions that regard marriage
as a fundamental tenet, allowing those religions to “place their ‘stamp
of approval’ on marriages”120 and preserving their “ability . . . to . . .
114

Id. at *5.
Id. at *1.
116
Id. at *14.
117
Although CFI challenged Indiana’s Solemnization Statute under the
Establishment Clause, the district court also assessed the constitutionality of the
Statute under the Free Exercise Clause, expressing doubt that CFI’s claim fell within
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Id. at *8-10. This Note does not address
whether CFI’s claim fell within the purview of the Establishment Clause or the Free
Exercise Clause. For a discussion of which of the two Clauses should guide the
analysis in claims of the nature brought by CFI, see the concurring and dissenting
opinions in Welsh v. U.S. and majority and concurring opinions in Cutter v.
Wilkinson.
118
Id. at *10.
119
Id.
120
Id.
115
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carry out their religious missions.”121 Finding that CFI was not a
religion and that CFI had no stance on marriage, the court concluded
that CFI was, therefore, not entitled to a similar accommodation.122
The district court further stated that CFI could not characterize its
beliefs as a religion simply to avoid the inconveniences of marriage
regulation. The district court then explained that in Wisconsin v. Yoder,
a religious accommodation case, the Supreme Court had stated that
“‘the very concept or ordered liberty precludes allowing [everyone] to
make . . . [their] own standards’” to trigger the protection of the
Religious Clauses and avoid state regulation.123 Thus, the district court
stated that it could not “commandeer the Indiana legislature” to
include CFI in the Solemnization Statute simply because CFI preferred
to solemnize its own marriages.124 Members of CFI, after all, the court
explained, had “numerous avenues through which they . . . [could]
legally wed.”125 They could continue with their secular celebrations
and then have their marriage solemnized by, for example, a judge as
the Solemnization Statute only prohibited CFI and others “from
signing marriage certificates.”126 In short, the court held that the
Statute could not amount to an establishment of religion as it only had
the “legitimate purpose of alleviating significant governmental
interference with pre-existing religious beliefs about marriage.”127
C.

The Appeal to the Seventh Circuit

CFI appealed the decision of the district court to the Seventh
Circuit. Before the Seventh Circuit, CFI argued that CFI’s beliefs were

121

Id.
Id. at *7, 10.
123
Id. at *9 (citations omitted).
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
Id. at *12.
122
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“equivalent to a religion”128 because CFI’s beliefs are sincere and
“address[ ] matters of ‘ultimate concern’ that occupy a ‘place parallel
to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons.’”129 Because
CFI had to be “deemed to be analogous to a religion, its exclusion
from the benefits bestowed by the Solemnization Statute represent[ed]
a preference for particular sects or creeds.”130 CFI further argued that
Indiana’s defense that it excluded CFI from the Solemnization Statute
because CFI takes no stance on religion was simply a pretext to avoid
the Establishment Clause claim. Given that Indiana was willing to
allow CFI’s secular celebrants to solemnize marriages if CFI declared
itself a religious organization, thereby rendering its leaders clergy, it
was apparent, CFI argued, that Indiana excluded CFI not because of
CFI’s stand on marriage, but because it was not a religious entity.131
Regardless of CFI’s position on marriage, however, CFI argued that
CFI members, like adherents of traditional religions, “desire to have
their wedding ceremonies reflect their values and beliefs.”132 For CFI
members, as for members of religions, “it is important to have
someone perform the [solemnization] ceremony who shares their
ethics and beliefs and who is able to assist them in in structuring a
ceremony in a way that affirms their philosophy.”133
In defending the constitutionality of the Solemnization Statute,
Indiana reiterated the holding of the district court that the
Solemnization Statute was a religious accommodation under which
CFI could not be included because CFI could not be said to be a
religion.134 Indiana further argued that states may constitutionally
accommodate religious beliefs without having to extend the same or
substantially similar accommodations to non-religious groups.
128

Reply Brief of Appellants-Plaintiffs, Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct.
Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014) (No. 12-3751), 2013 WL 1208815, at *9.
129
Id. at *10-11 (citations omitted).
130
Id. at *14.
131
Id. at *7, 8, 14.
132
Id. at *17.
133
Brief of Appellants, supra note 17, at 9.
134
Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *14-5.
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Quoting to Supreme Court precedent specifically addressing religious
accommodations and their relation to the neutrality principle, Indiana
pointed out that the Supreme Court had already stated that religious
accommodations need not to “come packaged with benefits to secular
entities” in order to comply with the Establishment Clause.135 Relying
on Marsh v. Chambers, a case in which the Supreme Court upheld the
opening of legislative sessions with Christian prayer, Indiana
explained that “[j]ust as legislative bodies may,” under Marsh, “invite
clergy to give a prayer without also inviting secular humanists to give
non-religious speeches, so may states continue to delegate to religious
clergy . . . the function of solemnizing marriages without also
delegating that function to other” non-religious groups.136
The Seventh Circuit was thus not asked to determine whether
conferring solemnization authority to religious groups may
accommodate religious marriage practices. The parties did not dispute
that the Solemnization Statute qualified as a religious accommodation.
Rather, the court was left with the question of whether the neutrality
principle required that CFI be included in the Solemnization Statute.
IV. THE SUPREME COURT’S AND SEVENTH’S CIRCUIT JURISPRUDENCE
ON RELIGIOUS ACCOMMODATIONS AND THE NEUTRALITY
PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court has long recognized that religious
accommodations are permissible, and sometimes even required, under
the Establishment Clause.137 In stating that religious accommodations
are not inherently incompatible with the Establishment Clause, the
Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he course of constitutional
neutrality . . . cannot be an absolutely straight line.”138 Instead, the
135

See id. at *43.
Id. at *22-23.
137
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 705
(1994); Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334 (1987); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n of
Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144-45 (1987).
138
Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970).
136
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principle of neutrality provides a corridor in which the government has
room to act to ensure that the objectives of both Religious Clauses are
fulfilled—those objectives being the guarantee to free exercise of
religion without state interference and without sponsorship.139 Indeed,
in the absence of religious accommodations, the basic purposes of the
Religious Clauses could be frustrated as rigid government regulation
(that, which would allow for no accommodations on the basis of
religion) could interfere with the practice of religion and, thereby,
inhibit neutrality towards religion.140 However, the Supreme Court has
also stated that religious accommodations are constitutional under the
Establishment Clause only if they comply with the principle of
neutrality, preferring neither religion over nonreligion nor any
particular religious beliefs.141
A.

The Supreme Court’s Definition of Religion

In assessing the compliance of a religious accommodation under
the neutrality principle, an initial challenge may be to determine
whether the beliefs allegedly excluded from a given accommodation
can be deemed to be a “religion.” This was one of the very challenges
the Seventh Circuit faced in Center for Inquiry.142 The United States
Constitution does not define religion and the Supreme Court has never
adopted or announced a constitutional definition of religion.
Nonetheless, the Court has provided ample guidance on what may
constitute religion for purposes of the First Amendment. Far from
exhibiting a static conception of the meaning of religion, the Court’s
understanding of religion has, for the most part, evolved with time.
At the beginning of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on the
meaning of religion, the Court followed the traditional view that
religion necessarily requires a belief in a deity. In Davis v. Beason, for
example, the Court stated that “the term ‘religion’ has reference to
139

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719-20 (2005).
Walz, 397 U.S. at 669.
141
Grumet, 512 U.S. at 696.
142
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2014).
140

53
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/3

22

Cortes: Marriage Solemnization and the First Amendment's Neutrality Princ

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 1

Fall 2014

one’s views of his relation to his Creator.”143 However, the Court’s
view of religion evolved with the passing of time. In Torcaso v.
Watkins, the Court explained that the term “religion” needs not to be
based on a belief in the existence of God to get First Amendment
protections.144 In stating so, the Court acknowledged the religious
diversity that existed in the country at the time, explaining in a
footnote that Americans were practicing religions that did not, in a
general sense, teach a belief in the existence of God, among them
“Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, [and] Secular Humanism.”145
In two subsequent cases of remarkable importance in the
jurisprudence of the meaning of religion, United States v. Seeger146
and Welsh v. United States,147 the Supreme Court dramatically
expanded the definition of religion. Seeger and Welsh called the Court
to interpret the meaning of “religious training and belief” in a statute
that exempted conscientious objectors from participating in war.148
Pursuant to the statute, an individual could claim conscientious
objector status if “by reason of religious training and belief . . . [the
individual was] conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form.”149 The statute defined “religious training and belief” as “an
individual’s belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties
superior to those arising from any human relation, but d[id not] not
include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a
merely personal moral code.”150
To avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional by limiting its
reach to only those religious beliefs rooted in a belief in a Supreme
143

133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890) abrogated on other grounds by Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
144
367 U.S. 488, 495 (1961).
145
Id. at 495 n.11.
146
380 U.S. 163 (1965).
147
398 U.S. 333 (1970).
148
Seeger, 380 U.S. at 165; Welsh, 398 U.S. at 346.
149
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 335 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations
omitted).
150
Id. at 337. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).
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Being, the Court interpreted “religious training and belief” in Seeger
to mean “a sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of
its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God.”151 Five years
later, in Welsh, the Court expanded the definition of religion even
further. There, to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional by
limiting its reach to only religious beliefs, the Court read “religious
training and belief” to include “deeply and sincerely h[e]ld beliefs that
are purely ethical or moral in source and content but that nevertheless
impose upon . . . [an individual] a duty of conscience to refrain from
participating in any war at any time.”152
The broad and liberal definition of religion the Court reached in
Seeger and, later, in Welsh is not, however, without any boundaries. In
Wisconsin v. Yoder,153 the Supreme Court discussed some limits on
what may be deemed a religion under the First Amendment. There, the
Court stated that “philosophical and personal” beliefs do not trigger
the protections of the Religion Clauses.154 Thus, “[a] way of life,
however virtuous and admirable,” the Court explained, does not
constitute religion, and “may not be interposed as a barrier to
reasonable state regulation.”155 In Yoder, the Court exempted from
compliance with Wisconsin’s compulsory school attendance law
Amish individuals who, for religious reasons, refused to send their
children to school past the eighth grade.156 In allowing the religious
exemption, the Court explained that “if the Amish had asserted their
claims [against compulsory education] because of their subjective
evaluation and rejection of the . . . secular values accepted by the
majority, their claims would” not have been entitled to an
accommodation.157 Instead, the Court noted, “the record . . .
support[ed],” that the Amish’s reasons for refusing to send their
151

Seeger, 380 U.S. at 176.
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340.
153
406 U.S. 205 (1972).
154
Id. at 216.
155
Id. at 215.
156
Id. at 206.
157
Id. at 216.
152
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children to school past the eighth grade were “not merely a matter of
personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an
organized group, and intimately related to daily living.”158
In Yoder, the Supreme Court thus clarified that personal
philosophies and “ways of life” do not amount to religious beliefs
under the First Amendment, perhaps to limit a broad reading of Welsh
that would have permitted such a result.159 The Court also appeared to
stay that “one essential characteristic of religion is that it comprises an
‘organized’ community practicing a distinct way of life which is in
turned based on its particular values.”160 Given, however, that none of
the individuals challenging the constitutionality of the statute in
Seeger and Welsh claimed to be to be part of an organized religious
group, it is unlikely that Yoder makes affiliation with a religious group
a requirement of religion. A better reading of Yoder is that the Court
considers affiliation with an organized religious group mere evidence
of religion.161 Importantly, Yoder “seems to leave intact” Seeger’s and
Welsh’s holding that sincerely held “beliefs [that] function in a position
parallel to that of traditional religious beliefs”162 are the equivalent of
religion for First Amendment purposes. Hence, Welsh, Seeger, and
Yoder, taken together, establish that secular beliefs that are sincerely
held and that occupy a place in the life of an individual similar to that
of religion may be regarded as religious and thus, be entitled to a
158

Id.
See generally B. Douglas Hayes, Secular Humanism in Public School
Textbooks: Thou Shalt Have No Other God (Except Thyself), 63 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 358, 361 (1988); L. Scott Smith, Esq., Constitutional Meanings of “Religion”
Past and Present: Explorations in Definition and Theory, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS.
L. REV. 89, 97 (2004); James M. Donovan, God Is As God Does: Law,
Anthropology, and the Definition of “Religion,” 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 23, 53
(1995).
160
Smith, supra note 159, at 97.
161
John C. Knechtle, If We Don’t Know What It Is, How Do We Know If It’s
Established?, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 521, 526 (2003); Mason v. Gen. Brown Cent. Sch.
Dist., 851 F.2d 47, 54 (2nd Cir. 1988) (stating that exemptions on the basis of
sincere religious beliefs are permitted without regard to church affiliation); Hanna v.
Sec'y of the Army, 513 F.3d 4, 15 (1st Cir. 2008).
162
Hayes, supra note 159, at 361.
159
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religious accommodation. A way of life and personal philosophies, in
contrast, are not entitled to religious protections under the First
Amendment.
B.

The Seventh Circuit’s Definition of Religion

The Supreme Court has not been alone in determining what
beliefs may qualify as religious for purposes of the First Amendment.
The Seventh Circuit has also had opportunity to address the definition
of religion. In Kaufman v. McCaughtry,163 for example, the Seventh
Circuit provided a test for determining what constitutes a religion for
First Amendment analysis. There, the Seventh Circuit explained that
whether a set of beliefs “is a ‘religion’ for First Amendment purposes
is a somewhat different question than whether its adherents believe in
a supreme being, or attend regular devotional services, or have a
sacred Scripture.”164 For First Amendment analysis, the Seventh
Circuit continued, the beliefs of a person represent that person’s
religion if the person “sincerely holds” those beliefs and such beliefs
deal “with issues of ‘ultimate concern’ that . . . occupy a ‘place parallel
to that filled by . . . God in traditionally religious persons.”165 Citing to
Torcaso, Welsh, and Seeger, the Seventh Circuit explained that its
definition of religion was consistent with the Supreme Court’s “broad
definition of ‘religion,’” which includes theistic, atheistic and nontheistic beliefs.166
C.

The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence on Religious
Accommodations and the Neutrality Principle

As previously discussed, neutrality does not prevent the
government from accommodating religion. But, it does forbid the
government from deviating from the corridor in between the two
163

419 F.3d 678 (7th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 681.
165
Id. (internal citations omitted).
166
Id. at 682.
164
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Religious Clauses, in which permissible religious accommodations
may exist. Since neutrality is a principle, and not a rule or a test, there
are no factors or prongs to determine when the deviation from that
corridor has been enough to turn an otherwise valid religious
accommodation into an impermissible advancement or establishment
of religion. Recognizing the lack of factors or prongs, the Supreme
Court has aptly stated that “[a]t some point, [an] accommodation may
devolve into ‘an unlawful fostering of religion.’”167 The lack of set
rules does not mean, however, that there are no parameters that help
establish that an accommodation violates the neutrality principle. To
the contrary, it is well settled that an accommodation that has the
intention or effect of preferring one religion over another or religion in
general over nonreligion is outside of the boundaries of benevolent
neutrality permitted by the Establishment Clause.168 In deciding
whether an accommodation prefers certain religious denominations or
religion in general over nonreligion, the best guidance is provided in
judicial precedent that has applied the principle of neutrality, even if
not explicitly, to contested religious accommodations. The following
Supreme Court cases illustrate the demands of the neutrality principle
on religious accommodations and help understand the holding of the
Seventh Circuit in Center for Inquiry.
1.

United States v. Seeger

United States v. Seeger represents one of the best examples in
Supreme Court jurisprudence on the requirement that the government
stays neutral towards religion when accommodating religion. Seeger is
of particular importance to this Note because it also involved a
challenge to a religious accommodation by individuals, who, similar to
CFI members, held, at best, untraditional religious beliefs. There, three
conscientious objectors challenged section 6(j) of the Universal
167

Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 334-35 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
168
Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 70507 (1994).
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Military Training and Service Act of 1948 under, inter alia, the
Establishment Clause.169 Section 6(j), the conscientious objector
statute, “exempte[d] from combatant training and service in the armed
forces . . . those persons who by reason of their religious training and
belief [we]re conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form” as a form of religious accommodation.170 For purposes of the
statute, “religious training and belief,” was defined as “an individual’s
belief in a relation to a Supreme Being involving duties superior to
those arising from any human relation, but (not including) essentially
political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal
moral code.”171 According to the conscientious objectors, the statute
violated the Establishment Clause because the definition of “religious
training and belief” preferred religion over nonreligion as well as
certain religions over others.172
The three objectors had applied and failed to qualify for the
conscientious objector exemption.173 In their application for the
exemption, they stated that they were conscientiously opposed to
participation in war on reason of “religious belief and training,” but
defined their religious beliefs in non-traditional ways.174 One of the
objectors, for example, “submitted a long memorandum . . . in which
he defined religion as the ‘sum and essence of one’s basic attitudes to
the fundamental problems of human existence.’”175 Most importantly,
the objectors could not say that they held their beliefs in relation to a
169

U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
Id. at 164-65.
171
Id. at 165 (internal quotations omitted).
172
Id.; see Brian A. Freeman, Expiating the Sins of Yoder and Smith: Toward
A Unified Theory of First Amendment Exemptions from Neutral Laws of General
Applicability, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 9, 35 (2001) (explaining that section 6(j) “[n]ot only . .
. den[ied] conscientious objector status to those whose objection was not grounded
on religious belief, but also . . . den[ied] that status . . . to those whose objection was
grounded on religious belief, if they were not members of a denomination possessing
an article of faith opposing war”).
173
Id. at 166-69.
174
Id. at 166-69, 186.
175
Id. at 168 (internal citations omitted).
170
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Supreme Being, namely an orthodox God.176 Seeger, one of the
objectors, for instance, had expressed “‘skepticism or disbelief in the
existence of God’”177 and, explained, instead that he believed in
“devotion to goodness and virtue for their own sakes . . . [as well as] in
a purely ethical creed.’”178 Thus, the Seeger Court had to determine
whether the beliefs of the three objectors fell within the statute’s
definition of “religious training and belief.” To do so, the Court had to
interpret the meaning of “religious training and belief”.179
The Court first noted that the statute defined “religious training
and belief” restrictively, requiring that a person hold beliefs involving
a relationship with a traditionally conceived Supreme Being, before
the person could be exempted from participating in war. The objectors’
convictions, though sincere and fundamental in their lives, did not
conform to this notion of religion.180 After engaging in statutory
interpretation, the Court concluded, however, that Congress could not
have meant to restrict the exemption only to those who believed in a
traditional Supreme Being, that is, a God. In the statute’s legislative
history, the Court found evidence that Congress was aware of the
myriad of conceptions that individuals have of a Supreme Being.181 As
the Court explained, “[s]ome believe in a purely personal God, some
in a supernatural deity; others think of religion as a way of life
envisioning as its ultimate goal the day when all men can live together
in perfect understanding and peace.”182 Congress, the Court reasoned,
must have chosen the word “Supreme Being” rather than God in order
to include all these conceptions of a Supreme Being and “keep[ ] with
its long-established policy of not picking and choosing among
religious beliefs.”183 Thus, “religious training and belief,” the Court
176

Id. at 166-69.
Id. at 166 (internal citations omitted).
178
Id.
179
Id. at 173.
180
Id. at 166-69.
181
Id. at 174-85.
182
Id. at 174.
183
Id. at 175.
177
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ultimately decided, meant “a sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the
God.”184 Pursuant to this definition, the objectors’ beliefs qualified as
“religious.”185
While the Court’s interpretation of “religious training and belief”
resulted in a remarkably strained reading of the statute—one which the
legislative history questionably supported186—the Court saw its
interpretation as necessary to save the statute’s constitutionality.
Construing the statute in this way, the Court explained, “avoid[ed]
imputing to Congress an intent to classify different religious beliefs,
exempting some and excluding others, and . . . [was] in accord with
the well-established congressional policy of equal treatment for those
whose opposition to service is grounded in their religious tenets.”187
Although the Court did not explicitly refer to the neutrality principle,
its interpretation of “religious training and belief” clearly alludes to the
constitutional requirement that the government remain neutral in its
accommodation of religious beliefs. As the Court stated, Congress
could not have intended to include some religious beliefs while
excluding others, as that would have been prohibited by the
Constitution.188 Indeed, commentators have argued that the Seeger
Court turned the statute’s intent “upside-down” as to eliminate its
preferentialism for religion and ensure that the statute conformed with
the requirement of neutrality.189 Moreover, by defining religion to
184

Id.
Id.
186
Id. at 188. (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The legislative history of this Act
leaves much in the dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if we construe
the words ‘Supreme Being’ to include the cosmos, as well as an anthropomorphic
entity. If it is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other instances where
we have gone to extremes to construe an Act of Congress to save it from demise on
constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the present one we said that the
words of a statute may be strained ‘in the candid service of avoiding a serious
constitutional doubt.”) (internal citations omitted).
187
Id. at 176.
188
Id.
189
See, e.g., Freeman, supra note 172, at 35-36.
185
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include beliefs not founded in a belief in a god, the Court was already
hinting to the fact that the government cannot, consistent with the
neutrality principle, accommodate religious beliefs, but not systems of
belief that are comparable to religion. In a later decision, Welsh v.
United States, the Supreme Court, came to that exact conclusion.
2.

Welsh v. United States

In Welsh v. United States,190 the Supreme Court was again called
to interpret the definition of “religious training and belief” for
purposes of the same conscientious objector statute that had been at
issue in Seeger. Welsh involved another conscientious objector, Welsh,
who also sought exemption from the Selective Service pursuant to the
conscientious objector statute.191 While Seeger and Welsh were almost
factually identical, there was a fundamental difference between the
two cases. In Seeger, the government had denied the conscientious
objectors’ claims because the conscientious objectors could not say
that they held their religious beliefs in relation to a traditionally
conceived Supreme Being.192 In Welsh, in contrast, the government
had denied Welsh’s claim because the government “‘could find no
religious basis for . . . [Welsh’s] beliefs, opinions, and convictions.’”193
Welsh had insisted that his beliefs, which prohibited him from taking a
human life, were not religious, but ethical and moral and that he held
his beliefs “‘with the strength of . . . religious convictions.’”194 Thus,
the Court in Welsh was “faced [with] the more serious problem of
determining which beliefs were ‘religious’ within the meaning of the
statute.”195
Once again, to avoid rendering the statute unconstitutional, the
Court interpreted “religious training and belief” to include beliefs not
190

398 U.S. at 335, 338 (1970).
Id. at 335.
192
Id. at 337-38.
193
Id. (internal citations omitted).
194
Id. at 343.
195
Id. at 338.
191
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rooted in religion, but that, nevertheless, “occupy in the life of . . . [an]
individual a place parallel to that filled by . . . God” in religious
adherents.196Accordingly, the Court held that “if an individual deeply
and sincerely holds beliefs which are purely ethical or moral in source
and content but which nevertheless impose upon him duty of
conscience to refrain from participating in any war at any time, such
individual is entitled to conscientious objector exemption,”197 as those
beliefs are his religion.198 Welsh was thus entitled to the exemption.199
In arriving at the conclusion that the exemption extended to nonreligious beliefs parallel to religion, the Court reiterated most of its
analysis and rationale in Seeger.200 Although, the Court did not
explicitly mention the neutrality principle, its opinion restated Seeger’s
overriding principle that the government may not make distinctions
among beliefs.201 Based on the premise that the government must
remain neutral towards religion, and relying on its analysis of the
legislative history of the statute in Seeger, the Court then concluded
that Congress could not have meant to exclude parallel religious
beliefs from the purview of the statute, as that would have been clearly
unconstitutional.202
Justice Harlan concurred with the result achieved by the
majority,203 but disagreed that the majority’s opinion could be justified
in the name of the doctrine of construing legislative enactments in a
way that would avoid rendering them unconstitutional.204 The
doctrine, he explained, permits the Court to salvage statutes when
196

Id. at 340.
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id.
200
Id. at 339-40.
201
Id. at 340-41.
202
Id. at 339-40.
203
Id. at 362. Because the majority interpreted the conscientious objector
statute to include non-religious beliefs, Welsh’s conviction for failing to submit to
induction into the Armed Forces was reversed. Id. at 344.
204
Id. at 345 (Harlan, J., concurring).
197
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there is “reason to believe that Congress did not intend to legislate
consequences that are unconstitutional,”205 but not to usurp
congressional authority to evade an important constitutional issue.206
According to Harlan, the legislative history of the conscientious
objector statute unequivocally demonstrated that Congress intended to
limit the exemption only to religious individuals.207 Thus, the Court
could not “as matter of statutory construction . . . conclude that any
asserted and strongly held belief satisfie[d] . . . [the exemption’s]
requirements.”208 The pressing constitutional issue, Harlan stated, was
whether the conscientious objector statute was compatible with the
Establishment Clause.209 The First Amendment, he explained,
incorporates a neutrality principle, which requires that “legislation
must, at the very least, be neutral.”210 Congress was under no
obligation to create a conscientious objector exemption.211 Having
decided to create an exemption, however, Harlan explained, Congress
could not “draw the line between theistic or nontheistic religious
beliefs on the one hand and secular beliefs on the other.”212 The
conscientious objector statute, he explained, “created a religious
benefit” by “exempting individuals whose beliefs were identical in all
respects to those held by [Welsh] except that they derived from a
religious source.” 213 Such favoritism, he stated, is not permitted under
the Establishment Clause.”214
Harlan’s concurrence is particularly illustrative of the demands of
the neutrality principle on religious accommodations as it speaks
directly of the principle and explains that the Establishment Clause
205

Id. at 354.
Id. at 354-55.
207
Id. at 351-54.
208
Id. at 352.
209
Id. at 356.
210
Id. at 361.
211
Id. at 356.
212
Id.
213
Id. at 362.
214
Id. at 356.
206
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does not tolerate distinctions between religion and parallel secular
beliefs. More importantly, by discussing the constitutional infirmities
from which the conscientious objector statute suffered, Harlan’s
concurrence reveals the constitutional considerations that likely drove
the decision of the majority to interpret religion broadly in order to
prevent the conscientious objector statute from making unlawful
distinctions between religious and equivalent religious beliefs. In this
sense, Welsh, though a statutory interpretation case, becomes
important to the resolution of challenges to religious accommodations
in cases, like Center for Inquiry, Inc., that arise under the Constitution.
3.

Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos

In Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints v. Amos,215 the Supreme Court spoke directly and
explicitly about the relationship between religious accommodations
and the neutrality principle. There, the Court upheld an exemption to
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act that allowed not-for profit religious
organizations to discriminate in hiring for any position on religious
grounds.216 Congress had enacted Title VII to prohibit employment
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex and national
origin.217 As originally enacted in 1964, Title VII had an exemption
that allowed religious not-for profit employers to discriminate on
religious grounds in hiring for religious jobs only.218 As amended in
1972, the exemption, Section 702 of the Title, allowed religious notfor profit employers to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for
any job, as form of religious accommodation.219

215

483 U.S. 327 (1987).
Id. at 339.
217
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West 2014).
218
Amos, 483 U.S. at 329.
219
Id.
216
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In Amos, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints owned
and operated a gymnasium that was open to the public.220 Arthur Frank
Mayson worked for the gymnasium as an engineer.221 After sixteen
years of employment, the Church discharged him when “he failed to
qualify for . . . a certificate that he . . . [was a] member of the Church
and eligible to attend its temples.”222 The Church justified its actions
under Section 702, as amended.223 Mayson, along with a class of
plaintiffs, challenged the constitutionality of Section 702, alleging
that, as applied to secular activity, it violated the neutrality principle
because it resulted in state sponsorship of religion by granting
religious organizations benefits in employment practices that were not
extended to secular entities.224
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Section 702, as
amended, did not violate the principle of neutrality.225 Under the
Establishment Clause, the Court explained, “there is ample room . . .
for ‘benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist
without [government] sponsorship.’”226 In enacting Section 702, the
Court explained, Congress was not abandoning neutrality, but
furthering it by “alleviat[ing] significant governmental interference
with the ability of not-for profit religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions.”227 More succinctly, the exemption
simply removed the burden of government regulation over
employment decisions that Title VII, as originally enacted in 1964, had
220

Id. at 330.
Id.
222
Id.
223
Id. at 331.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 339-40. The Supreme Court analyzed Section 702’s compliance with
the neutrality principle under the framework of the Lemon Test. Id. at 335-39. The
Lemon Test is a three-pronged test to evaluate the constitutionality of a law under
the Establishment Clause. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). The
applicability of the Lemon Test to religious accommodations is beyond the subject
of this Note.
226
Amos, 483 U.S. at 334 (citations omitted).
227
Id. at 339.
221
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placed on religious organizations.228 Where the “government acts with
the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion,” the Court continued, there is “no reason to require that the
exemption comes packaged with benefits to secular entities” to be in
compliance with the neutrality principle.229
4.

Cutter v. Wilkinson

In Cutter v. Wilkinson,230 the Supreme Court further elaborated on
the role of neutrality in religious accommodations. There, the Court
addressed the constitutionality of Section Three of the Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA) under the
Establishment Clause.231 Section Three of RLUIPA provides, in
pertinent part, that “[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden
on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution,” unless the burden furthers “a compelling governmental
interest,” by “the least restrictive means.”232 RLUIPA defines
“religious exercise” to include “any exercise of religion, whether or
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”233 In
Cutter, prison inmates sued the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction, alleging that Ohio prison officials, in violation of RLUIPA,
had burdened their exercise of “‘nonmainstream’ religions: the
Satanist, Wicca, and Asatru . . . and the Church of Jesus Christ
Christian.”234 Specifically, the inmates alleged that the prison officials
had denied them, inter alia, “‘access to religious literature . . .
opportunities for group worship that . . . [were] granted to adherents of
mainstream religions . . . [and access to] a chaplain trained in their

228

Id. at 335-36.
Id. at 338.
230
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
231
Id. at 709.
232
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc-1(a)(1)-(2) (West 2000).
233
Id. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
234
Cutter, 544 U.S. at 712.
229
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faith.’”235 In response, the prison officials challenged RLUIPA’s
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause as an improper
advancement of religion.236
The Supreme Court unanimously held that Section Three of
RLUIPA, on its face, is an accommodation of religion permissible
under the Establishment Clause.237 The Court explained that Section
Three qualifies as a religious accommodation because it “alleviates
exceptional government-created burdens on private religious exercise”
in “state-run institutions.”238 Where the government acts to remove
“government-imposed burdens on religious exercise,” the removal “is
more likely to be perceived ‘as an accommodation of the exercise of
religion rather than as . . . [an advancement] of religion.’”239 Section
Three of RLUIPA, the Court continued, does not advance or establish
religion simply because it does not similarly accommodate the other
constitutional rights of the inmates, which may also be subject to
governmental burdens. Citing to Amos, the Court reiterated that
religious accommodations “need not come packaged with benefits for
secular entities”240 in order to comply with the neutrality principle.
Just at the government may exempt religious organizations from
regulations that burden the exercise of religion without having to also
exempt secular entities, the government may choose to accommodate
the free exercise of religion of inmates without having to also
accommodate the inmates’ free speech or right to assemble in order to
comply with the Establishment Clause.
Lastly, the Court pointed out that Section Three complied with the
Establishment Clause because it did not single out any religion for a
particular treatment. RLUIPA, the Court stated, “confers no privileged
status on any particular religious sect, and singles out no bona fide

235

Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id.
237
Id. at 720.
238
Id. at 720-21.
239
Id. at 720 (citations omitted).
240
Id. at 724 (internal quotation marks omitted) (internal citations omitted).
236
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faith for disadvantageous treatment.”241 Given that “RLUIPA does not
differentiate among bona fide faiths,” the Court held that it complied
with the neutrality principle.242
D.

The Seventh Circuit’s Jurisprudence on Religious
Accommodations and the Neutrality Principle

The Seventh Circuit has also spoken about the relationship
between religious accommodations and the neutrality principle. A very
illustrative case is Kaufman.243 There, Wisconsin inmate James
Kaufman filed a First Amendment claim against prison officials after
they “refused to allow him to create an inmate group to study and
discuss atheism.”244 Notwithstanding the officials’ refusal to allow
Kaufman to start an atheist study group, the prison officials allowed
the gatherings of Christian, Muslims, Buddhist and other inmates to
study their respective religions.245 Among other things, Kaufman
alleged that the prison officials’ actions in accommodating only certain
religious beliefs violated the Establishment Clause.246 The prison
officials, however, maintained that no religious accommodation was
warranted for Kaufman’s beliefs because atheism, as Kaufman himself
insisted, is not a religion.247
The Seventh Circuit disagreed and held that the prison officials’
actions violated the Establishment Clause as they failed to comply
with the neutrality principle.248 The court began its analysis by first
concluding that Kaufman’s atheist beliefs constituted a religion for
241

Id.
Id. at 723.
243
419 F.3d 678 (2005).
244
Id. at 680.
245
Id. at 684.
246
Id. at 680-81.
247
Id.
248
Id. at 683-84. In concluding that the prison officials’ actions violated the
First Amendment, the Seventh Circuit applied the Lemon Test. See supra note 225
for an explanation of the Lemon Test.
242
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purposes of the First Amendment because they “play[ed] a central role
in his life”249 and it was undisputed that Kaufman deeply and sincerely
held those beliefs.250 The court then proceeded to explain that under
the Establishment Clause “the government may not aid one religion,
aid all religions or favor one religion over another.’”251 The First
Amendment, the court explained, simply “‘does not allow a state to
make it easier for adherents of one faith to practice their religion than
for adherents of another faith to practice their religion, unless there is a
secular justification for the difference in treatment.’”252 The prison
officials, however, could not advance a secular reason that would
support that “meeting[s] of atheist inmates would pose a greater
security risk [to the prison] than meetings of inmates of other
faiths.”253 While the Seventh Circuit recognized that Cutter had held
that religious accommodations need not to extend to non-religious
practices in order to be permissible, the court explained that Cutter did
not resolve the neutrality principle issue in the instant case.254 While
religious accommodations may be reserved only for religious groups,
it does not follow that set of secular beliefs that qualify as religious for
First Amendment purposes may be permissibly excluded from
religious accommodations.255 The court concluded that by
accommodating some religious beliefs, but not Kaufman’s beliefs, the
prison officials were “promoting” and favoring certain religions, in
violation of the Establishment Clause.”256

249

Id. at 682.
Id. See supra Section IV B, for a discussion of the test the Seventh Circuit
employed to determine whether atheism qualified as a religion for First Amendment
purposes.
251
Id. at 683 (citing to Berger v. Rensselaer Cent. Sch. Corp., 982 F.2d 1160,
1168-69 (7th Cir.1993)).
252
Id. (citing to Metzl v. Leininger, 57 F.3d 618, 621 (7th Cir.1995)).
253
Id. at 684.
254
Id.
255
Id.
256
Id.
250
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V. ANALYSIS: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT DECISION
IN CENTER FOR INQUIRY
A.

The Seventh Circuit’s Holding

On July 14, 2014, in a unanimous opinion authored by Judge
Frank H. Easterbrook, the Seventh Circuit unanimously held that
Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the principle of neutrality.257
Although the court recognized that religious accommodations
inherently treat the accommodated religion differently, it stated that
such an explanation could “not be a complete answer” to CFI’s claims
that the Solemnization Statute preferred religion over comparable
secular beliefs.258 Given that “[n]eutrality is essential to the validity of
an accommodation,”259 religious accommodations, the court
explained, may neither treat religion favorably over parallel nonreligious beliefs nor confer special benefits on certain religious
sects.260 Indiana’s Solemnization Statute suffered from both defects.
The Statute conferred the authority to solemnize a marriage only to
certain religious organizations and it also withheld such authority from
individuals holding secular beliefs parallel to religion.261
B.

CFI’s Beliefs are the Equivalent of Religion for
First Amendment Purposes

To reach its holding, the Seventh Circuit first had to determine
whether CFI’s beliefs qualified as a “religion” under the First
Amendment. The State of Indiana extensively argued262 and, the

257

Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869 (7th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 872.
259
Id.
260
Id. at 872-73.
261
Id. at 872-74.
262
Id. at 871.
258
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district court opined,263 that CFI could not be treated as a religion
because CFI, itself, insisted that it was not a religion. CFI, however,
maintained that its beliefs, even if not religious in a conventional
sense, were the equivalent of religion because they occupy a place
parallel to religion in the lives of its members.264 Relying on its own as
well as Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of religion, the
Seventh Circuit properly determined that CFI’s beliefs were the
equivalent of religion for purposes of the First Amendment.
The court began its analysis by stating that under Seeger and
Welsh a “serious and sincere[ly] held moral system” that occupies a
place in the life of an individual parallel to that of religion must be
treated the same as religion.265 The court did not have to pause to
examine the sincerity with which members of CFI held their beliefs, as
that was never contested. In determining that CFI’s beliefs qualified as
a moral set of beliefs, the court deferred to CFI’s uncontroverted
assertion that its beliefs rest on “strong ethical values based on critical
reason and scientific inquiry.”266 The court showed the same deference
towards CFI’s uncontested assertion that “its methods and values play
the same role in its members’ lives as religious methods and values
play in the lives of adherents.”267 Any further analysis under Seeger
and Welsh would have been unnecessary. In Seeger, the Supreme
Court had clearly stated that “a sincere and meaningful belief which
occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by
God” is a person’s religion.268 CFI’s beliefs squarely fell within that
definition. Moreover, it was clear that CFI’s beliefs were not different
to those of Welsh, who had also explained his beliefs as ethical and
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Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Clerk, Marion Cir. Ct, No. 1:12-CV-00623-SEB,
2012 WL 5997721, at *7 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 30, 2012).
264
Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 128, at *9-11.
265
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
266
Id. at 871.
267
Id.
268
U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965).
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moral and had maintained that it held such beliefs “‘with the strength
of . . . traditional religious convictions.’”269
Given, however, that Seeger and Welsh defined religion under a
statute rather than under the Constitution, the Seventh Circuit’s
analysis necessarily had to go further. Indeed, Seeger and Welsh
defined religion for purposes of the conscientious objector statute, but,
as the Seventh Circuit explained, the Supreme Court interpreted
religion broadly as to allow the statute to pass constitutional muster.270
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Welsh emphatically stated that the
conscientious objector statute had the fatal defect of preferring religion
over nonreligion and that without the majority’s contortionism to read
religion to include parallel moral and ethical beliefs, the statute would
have been helplessly unconstitutional.271 Thus, the fact that the
Supreme Court defined religion broadly in Seeger and Welsh to avoid
rendering the statute unconstitutional, “implie[s] that the constitutional
definition of religion also should be construed as broadly.”272 In fact,
in constitutional cases, the Supreme Court has also appeared to lean
towards a broad definition of religion.
Accordingly, and continuing with its analysis of whether CFI’s
beliefs qualified as religious, the Seventh Circuit cited to Torcaso, a
269

Welsh v. U.S., 398 U.S. 333, 343 (1970) (citations omitted).
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
271
Welsh, 398 U.S. at 354-59 (Harlan, J., concurring).
272
Jeffrey L. Oldham, Constitutional “Religion” A Survey of First Amendment
Definitions of Religion, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 117, 130 (2001); Donovan, supra
note 159, at 52 (“[M]ost agree that we can expect the Seeger-Welsh reading, or some
form thereof, to apply to the constitutional use of “religion.”). See also Kaufman v.
McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing and using Welsh’s and
Seeger’s definition of religion as the definition that governs First Amendment
constitutional analysis); Ben Clements, Defining “Religion” in the First
Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 532, 538-39 (1989) (“
[C]ourts and commentators have generally interpreted Seeger as signaling a broad
concept of religion for First Amendment purposes.”); Greenawalt, Religion as a
Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REV. 753, 760-61 (1984) (“[T]he
Supreme Court’s broad statutory construction of religion [in Seeger and Welsh] . . .
has led other courts and scholars to assume that the constitutional definition of
religion is now much more extensive than it once appeared to be.”).
270
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constitutional case, and explained that in that case the Supreme Court
explained in a footnote that “secular humanism must be treated the
same as religion.”273 The Seventh Circuit’s reference to Torcaso was of
particular importance to the resolution of whether CFI’s beliefs were
religious because CFI’s beliefs are commonly known as secular
humanism and courts have consistently opined that secular humanism
is a religion under the First Amendment.274 And, while the footnote in
Torcaso may arguably be dicta, the footnote “trenchantly illustrated
the Court’s . . . [understanding] that nontheistic systems of belief can
be labeled ‘religion.’”275 The Seventh Circuit, however, justifiably
explained that, given that Torcaso “might be characterized as dicta,” it
could not rely on Torcaso to conclusively determine whether CFI’s
beliefs were religious.276 But, even when Torcaso may not be
conclusive to whether CFI qualified as a religion, the Seventh Circuit
stated that it needed to go no further than its decision in Kaufman to
hold that CFI’s beliefs qualified as a religion.
Kaufman, the Seventh Circuit continued, was a constitutional a
case, in which the Seventh Circuit had held that atheism qualified as a
religion for purposes of the First Amendment because atheism
“occup[ies] a ‘place parallel to that filled by . . . God in traditionally
religious persons.’”277 “What is true of atheism,” the Seventh Circuit
continued, “is equally true of secular humanism, and as true in daily

273

Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
Patrick M. Garry, Religious Freedom Deserves More Than Neutrality: The
Constitutional Argument for Nonpreferential Favoritism of Religion, 57 FLA. L. REV.
1, 33 (2005).
275
Smith, supra note 159, at 95. In fact, Torcaso is often cited to convey the
Court’s emerging understanding that, under the auspice of the First Amendment,
religion refers to matters of ultimate concern in the lives of individuals, whether they
stem from a belief in a deity, theism, or purely secular beliefs. See, e.g., Daniel A.
Spiro, The Creation of A Free Marketplace of Religious Ideas: Revisiting the
Establishment Clause After the Alabama Secular Humanism Decision, 39 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 31 (1987).
276
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
277
Id. (citing to Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 681).
274
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life as in prison.”278 That CFI refuses to call itself a religious
organization and that its members insist that they are not religious, the
Seventh Circuit continued, is irrelevant to the question of whether CFI
is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.279 In this regard,
the court explained, CFI is no different to the plaintiff in Kaufman who
also insisted that atheism was not a religion, but who, nevertheless was
entitled to the protections of the First Amendment because his atheist
beliefs occupied a place in his life comparable to religion.280 CFI
embraces a secular moral system of beliefs, the court concluded, that
is equivalent to religion except for the belief in a god and, as such, CFI
is entitled to the protections of the First Amendment.281
1.

The Seventh Circuit’s Omission of Yoder

In concluding that CFI’s beliefs were equivalent to religion, the
Seventh Circuit relied on Seeger, Welsh and Torcaso, to the complete
exclusion of Yoder. At first sight, the Seventh Circuit’s omission of
any reference to Yoder and its readiness to proceed with its analysis
under Seeger and Welsh, while relying on Torcaso, hardly seems
neutral to the positions of the parties. Seeger’s and Welsh’s
interpretation of “religious belief and training” represents the Supreme
Court’s most expansive and liberal definition of religion.282 The
Court’s conception of religion in Torcaso, as already explained, is also
broad. Yoder, on the other hand, appears to be an effort by the
Supreme Court to return to a more traditional definition of religion.283

278

Id.
Id.
280
Id.
281
Id.
282
See Oldham, supra note 272, at 134; Donovan, supra note 159, at 52;
Stanley Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion
Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REV. 233, 267 (1989); Smith, supra note 159, at 95.
283
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873. It is not, of course, that the Seventh
Circuit regarded the prison context as immaterial, but for purposes of deciding what
constitutes a religion (and whether an accommodation complies with the neutrality
279
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Thus, those beliefs that may qualify as religious under Seeger and
Welsh may not necessarily also be religious under Yoder.
Notwithstanding Yoder, commentators284 and courts285 agree that
Welsh and Seeger are the measure of what constitutes a religion for
First Amendment purposes. Even after Yoder, the Supreme Court,
itself, continued to adhere to a view of religion that is congruent with
its broad definition of religion in Seeger and Welsh.286 The Seventh
Circuit had also previously explained that the Supreme Court
embraces a broad definition of religion. In Kaufman, for example, the
Seventh Circuit stated that its expansive definition of religion was
crafted to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s broad conception of
religion.287 Given that Seeger and Welsh are consistently regarded as
the measure of what qualifies as a religious belief under the First
Amendment, it is justifiable and unsurprising that the Seventh Circuit
principle), the walls of a prison do not change the analysis of whether a set of secular
beliefs occupies a place parallel to that of religion in the life of an individual.
284
See Donovan, supra note 159, at 52.
285
See, e.g., Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 681-82 (7th Cir. 2005);
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of City of N.Y., 492 F.3d 89, 126 (2d Cir.
2007); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 52-3 (1985) (adhering to a broad definition
of religion and acknowledging that religion under the First Amendment includes
more than just traditional religious beliefs).
286
See Oldham, supra note 272, at 134; Clements, supra note 272, at 539
(“Although . . . [Yoder] seem[ed] to cast doubt on the viability of the Seeger
approach as a constitutional test for religion, it is unclear how much weight Yoder
carries in determining the scope of “religion.” Since the state did not dispute the
religious nature of the Amish practices, the definition of religion was not at issue,
and the . . . [Court’s statements on religion are] dicta. As a result, Yoder should not
necessarily be read as a rejection of the Seeger approach in constitutional cases.);
Ingber, supra note 134, at 263. (“[T]he Yoder opinion made no effort to define
religion.”); Smith, supra note 159, at 97 (stating that even when Yoder may have
suggested an attempt by the Supreme Court to “commence the task of formulating a
conservative content-based definition of it . . . Yoder has remained an island unto
itself”). See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 52-3 (speaking of religion in broad terms,
acknowledging that religion encompasses more than just beliefs in relationship to a
god); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725 n.13 (2005) (explaining in dicta that
Seeger is the governing framework to determine whether a particular belief is
religious under the First Amendment).
287
Kaufman, 419 F.3d at 682.
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did not even mention Yoder. Yoder would not have changed the result
the Seventh Circuit reached as CFI’s beliefs are not a mere way of
living or a simple philosophy and, the fact that CFI is an organized
group would have provided any evidence of religious affiliation that
Yoder may require. An application of Yoder, however, would have
resulted in confusion as to what the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme
Court regard as the appropriate test to determine what qualifies as a
religious belief. Specifically, an application of Yoder would have
mistakenly signaled a judicial attempt to return to a more traditional
definition of religion when, in fact, the Supreme Court’s and the
Seventh Circuit’s jurisprudence on religion have, for the most part,
moved towards a broad and liberal definition of religion. The Supreme
Court and the Seventh Circuit have interpreted religion broadly to
recognize the rich and diverse beliefs that citizens in this country
regard as their “religion.”288 An adoption of the narrower definition of
religion of Yoder could potentially leave many beliefs that are the
equivalent of religion unprotected under the Religious Clauses and, in
turn, hinder the continued existence of religious exercise without
government interference.
Nonetheless, a mention to Yoder for the discrete purpose of
refuting the district court’s suggestion that CFI’s only purpose in
asserting that its beliefs were equivalent to religion was to avoid the
inconveniences of marriage regulation would have been justified. In
Yoder, the Supreme Court warned that mere philosophies and “ways of
living” could not trigger the protection of the Religious Clauses and
thus, allow individuals to escape proper state regulation.289 Hence, the
Court explained that had the Amish expressed their objections to
compulsory education in terms of a subjective evaluation of the value
of such education or a belief that there were better or alternative ways
to live one’s life, the Amish would not have been entitled to a religious
exemption.290 Just as that was not the case of the Amish, it was also
288

See, e.g., U.S. v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 174-85 (1965); Torcaso v. Watkins,
367 U.S. 488, 495 n.11 (1961).
289
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972).
290
Id. at 216.

77
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss1/3

46

Cortes: Marriage Solemnization and the First Amendment's Neutrality Princ

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 1

Fall 2014

not the case of CFI. First, CFI’s system of beliefs is not a philosophy
or way of living. CFI embraces a set of moral and ethical beliefs,
which in turn, direct and guide the lives of its members in the same
way religion governs the lives of adherents. Second, and most
importantly, CFI did not challenge the Solemnization Statute based on
a subjective evaluation of state regulation of marriage. Instead, CFI
challenged the Solemnization Statute on the grounds that the Statute
prevented CFI members from having a “ceremony solemnized by
someone who share[d] the[ ] [very] ethics and beliefs”291 that guide
their lives. That CFI does not have a doctrinal stance on marriage, as
some traditional religions do, does not mean that CFI members do not
regard “having a ceremony solemnized by someone who shares their
ethics and beliefs as extremely important and necessary . . . way of
expressing their values.”292 In fact, the very reason why the state of
Indiana had decided to accommodate traditional religions was to honor
the “preferences . . . [of members of those religions] not to become
legally . . . [married] until the moment when . . . [their marriage was]
also consecrated by a religious ceremony” that celebrated their
values.293
Related to this point, the Seventh Circuit regarded as meritless
Indiana’s assertion that members of CFI were not excluded from the
Solemnization Statute because they could “first get a license, then
have a . . . [CFI secular] celebrant perform a public ceremony
appropriate to their beliefs, and finally have a court clerk or similar
functionary solemnize the marriage.”294 That assertion, the Seventh
Circuit stated, only “restate[d] the discrimination” that the CFI was
suffering at the hands of the State of Indiana.295 CFI’s “ability to carry
out a sham ceremony, with the real business done in a back of office,”
the Seventh Circuit stated, does not address the fact that CFI is parallel
291

Reply Brief of Appellants, supra note 128, at *7.
Id.
293
Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *23-24.
294
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 873 (7th Cir.
2014).
295
Id.
292
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to religion for purposes of the Solemnization Statute and that it thus
should be treated the same way as religion.296 By condemning
Indiana’s suggestion that CFI could simply resort to sham ceremonies,
the Seventh Circuit exalted the importance of respecting the diversity
of religious beliefs and the premise that the Establishment class
protects traditional religious beliefs as well as all other beliefs that
citizens may sincerely regard as the equivalent of religion in their
lives.
C.

Indiana’s Solemnization Statute Violates
the Neutrality Principle

Once the Seventh Circuit determined that CFI’s beliefs were the
equivalent of religion, it proceeded to an analysis of the Solemnization
Statute under the neutrality principle. The Seventh Circuit began by
stating that under Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit precedent
“neutrality is essential to the validity of an accommodation.”297 Thus,
when the state accommodates religion, it cannot choose favorites298—
that is, it cannot draw distinctions between religious denominations
and “religious and secular beliefs that hold the same place in
adherents’ lives.”299 Indiana’s Solemnization Statute, the court stated,
made those very distinctions by granting the authority to solemnize
marriages only to certain religious sects, while excluding certain other
denominations as well groups that hold beliefs equivalent to religion,
even though all of them celebrate marriage.300

296

Id.
Id.
298
Id.
299
Id. at 873.
300
Id. at 872-74.
297
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Neutrality towards Secular Beliefs that are the
Equivalent of Religion

The Seventh Circuit first noted that the Solemnization Statute
failed to comply with the neutrality principle because it “favored
religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances that are
equivalent to theistic ones.”301 The court explained that the
Solemnization Statute favored religion over equivalent secular beliefs
by extending the authority to solemnize a civil marriage only to
religious groups. Those who embrace those equivalent belief systems,
the court explained, “want their own views to be expressed by
celebrants at marriages,” and “the state must treat them the same way
it treats religion.”302 Thus, given that the state of Indiana chose to
accommodate the marriage ceremonies of traditional religions, it was
required to also accommodate the marriage celebrations of CFI.303
Indiana’s argument, the court continued, that, under Marsh v.
Chambers, Indiana may permissibly accommodate religious groups
without extending the accommodation to parallel non-religious groups
was meritless.304 In Marsh, the Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of opening state legislative sessions with nonsectarian, Judeo-Christian prayer by a clergyman.305 In upholding the
prayer, the Supreme Court stated that, notwithstanding that the prayer
was based in the Judeo-Christian tradition and conducted by a
clergyman from only one denomination, the prayer was not an
establishment of religion.306 Instead, the Court explained, the prayer
was “simply a tolerable acknowledgement”307 of the long and widely
held practice in this country of opening legislative sessions with prayer

301

Id. at 873.
Id.
303
Id.
304
Id. at 874.
305
463 U.S. 783, 792-95 (1983).
306
Id.
307
Id. at 792.
302
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by a chaplain.308 Stretching the holding of Marsh from its unique
application to legislative prayer,309 Indiana had argued that Marsh
allows governments to permissibly—that is, consistent with the
neutrality principle—accommodate religion without having to extend
the accommodation to non-religious groups.310 More specifically,
Indiana argued, that “[j]ust as legislative bodies may invite clergy to
give a prayer without also inviting secular humanists to give nonreligious speeches, so may states . . . delegate to religious clergy . . .
the function of solemnizing marriages without also delegating that
function to other” non-religious groups.311
The Seventh Circuit properly found Marsh inapplicable.312 Marsh,
the Seventh Circuit explained, concerned the long-held practice of
opening legislative sessions with non-denominational prayer.313 Thus,
Marsh dealt with “the government’s own operations;” not with the
government’s regulation of private conduct.314 This was an important
distinction as an inherent characteristic of a religious accommodation
is that it lifts regulatory burdens the government has previously placed
on the exercise of religion of private individuals and entities. All
Marsh establishes, the Seventh Circuit continued, is “that a
government may, consistent with the First Amendment, open
legislative sessions with Christian prayers while not inviting leaders of
308

Id. at 792, 786.
See, e.g., Snyder v. Murray City Corp., 159 F.3d 1227, 1232 (10th Cir.
1998) (“[T]he evolution of the Establishment Clause jurisprudence indicates that the
constitutionality of legislative prayers is a sui generis legal question.”); Cammack v.
Waihee, 932 F. 2d 765, 772 (9th Cir. 1991) (refusing to apply Marsh outside of the
context of legislative prayer based on “reluctan[ce] to extend a ruling explicitly
based upon the ‘unique history’ surrounding legislative prayer” to different
contexts.); Weisman v. Lee, 728 F. Supp. 68, 74 (D.R.I.) aff'd, 908 F.2d 1090 (1st
Cir. 1990) aff'd, 505 U.S. 577, (1992) (“The Marsh holding was narrowly limited to
the unique situation of legislative prayer.”).
310
Brief of Appellees, supra note 14, at *22-25.
311
Id. at *22-23.
312
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc. v. Marion Cir. Ct. Clerk, 758 F.3d 869, 874 (7th Cir.
2014).
313
Id.
314
Id.
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other religions.”315 Marsh, however, “do[es] not begin to suggest that a
state could limit the solemnization of weddings” to certain religious
groups.316
While the Seventh Circuit correctly explained that Marsh did not
establish that states may accommodate religious beliefs while
excluding parallel secular beliefs, the Seventh Circuit did not address
how Amos and Cutter do not support such a conclusion. Both, Amos
and Cutter addressed religious accommodations and stated that
“religious accommodations need not come packaged with benefits for
secular entities” to comply with the neutrality principle.317 At first
sight, Amos and Cutter may appear to support Indiana’s argument that
it needed not to accommodate the beliefs of CFI in the Solemnization
Statute to comply with the Establishment Clause. A closer look,
however, reveals that Amos and Cutter cannot be taken to hold that the
government may, consistent with the neutrality principle,
accommodate only individuals or organizations that embrace
traditional religious beliefs while denying the same accommodation to
groups that have a belief system that is comparable to religion.318 The
Seventh Circuit likely recognized this at the beginning of the opinion
by stating that while Amos and other Supreme Court cases explain that
“accommodations, by definition, treat the accommodated religion
differently from one or more secular groups,” that could not be “a
complete answer” to the fact that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute
distinguished between religion and comparable secular beliefs. 319
Indeed, Amos and Cutter could not be an answer to the
distinctions the Solemnization Statute made as those cases more likely
315

Id.
Id.
317
Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005).
318
See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior
and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1793, 1841 (2006) (discussing Amos and stating that under Amos “exemptions
are invalid if they . . . are confined to a single sect, or to a single religious practice in
a context where other religious practices are equally relevant to the exemption”).
319
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 872.
316
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stand for the more general proposition that the government does not
violate the neutrality principle simply when, with the purpose of
accommodating religion, it lifts government-imposed regulations from
religious organizations, without also lifting the regulation from the rest
of society. Such a conclusion is warranted given that Amos and Cutter,
in contrast to Seeger and Welsh, did not address challenges to the
accommodations at issue by groups claiming that their religious or
comparable religious beliefs had been excluded from the
accommodations. Instead, Amos and Cutter addressed challenges to
the accommodations by groups who, far from claiming a religious
entitlement to the accommodations, simply argued that the exemptions
or “benefits” the accommodations conferred on religious groups had to
be extended to all groups in order for the accommodations to be
constitutional. For example, in Amos the Court only addressed the
validity of Section 702 of Title VII in general, concluding that it did
not violate the neutrality principle because it is simply sought to lift
regulatory burdens the state had placed on the exercise of religion of
religious entities. Given these distinctions, Amos and Cutter are better
read as simply “creat[ing] a zone of [constitutionally] permissible
accommodation of religion.”320 It does not follow, however, that
Amos’s and Cutter’s recognition that the government may
accommodate religion, that an accommodation may constitutionally be
limited to religious beliefs to the exclusion of equivalent beliefs.321 In
fact, the opposite is true. In Cutter, for instance, the Supreme Court
specifically explained that RLUIPA was facially constitutional because

320

See Shivakumar, supra note 33, at 543; Timothy J. Aspinwall, Religious
Exemptions to Childhood Immunization Statutes: Reaching for A More Optimal
Balance Between Religious Freedom and Public Health, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 109,
127 (1997) (“Though Amos is significant because it upholds an exemption permitted
exclusively for religion, it should not be read to indicate unrestrained Establishment
Clause permissiveness.”).
321
McConnell, supra note 41, at 706 (“Although . . . Amos . . .[does not]
allude[ ] to the issue, the logic of the Religion Clauses requires that accommodations
be extended to all comparable religious practices.”).
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it did not suffer from the fatal defect of discriminating among “bonafide faiths.”322
An argument that by “bona-fide faith” the Supreme Court was
referring only to sincerely held religious beliefs, but not sincerely held
equivalent beliefs, is possible, but highly questionable, as that would
have contradicted the Court’s long-standing jurisprudence on the
meaning of religion. Given the Supreme Court’s history of defining
religion broadly, it is unlikely that Amos and Cutter controverted the
Court’s holding in Seeger and Welsh that religious accommodations
must extend to secular systems of belief which are the equivalent of
religion. The Seventh Circuit’s discussion of Seeger, Welsh and
Torcasso in determining that CFI’s beliefs were equivalent to religion
stresses this point. Under those cases, the Seventh Circuit explained,
the state must treat secular systems that are equivalent to religion “the
same way it treats religion.”323 Thus, while Amos and Cutter allow the
government to accommodate religion, the authority to accommodate,
as the Seventh Circuit properly pointed out, “does not imply an ability
to favor religions over non-theistic groups that have moral stances that
are equivalent to theistic ones except for non-belief in God or
unwillingness to call themselves religions.”324
The fact that CFI refused to call itself a religion colored the entire
opinion of the Seventh Circuit. In analyzing the compliance of the
Solemnization Statute with the neutrality principle, the Seventh Circuit
could have simply referred to CFI as just another religious
denomination, instead of referring to it as the equivalent of religion (or
parallel to religion), and dispose of the issue that way. Such a course
of action would have made the analysis more straightforward as the
Establishment Clause does not tolerate distinctions between religions.
The court chose, however, not to carry the analysis in that manner
probably out of respect for CFI’s insistence that it refutes theism and
that it is far and foremost not a religious organization. Moreover, the
court probably decided not to label CFI as a religion in order to
322

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723-24 (2005).
Ctr. for Inquiry, Inc., 758 F.3d at 873.
324
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promote the acceptance of the rich and diverse beliefs that Americans
now embrace as their “religion.” If the Supreme Court and the Seventh
Circuit have defined religion so broadly has been precisely to avoid
distinctions among beliefs and to afford citizens the free exercise of
their “religion” without sponsorship and without interference. In this
respect, the Seventh Circuit had strong words for the State of Indiana,
which had attempted to diminish CFI’s claims by stating that all CFI
needed to do to come within the purview of the Solemnization Statute
was to declare itself a religious organization and its leaders members
of the clergy.325 Indiana’s willingness, the court stated, “to recognize
marriages performed by hypocrites,” 326 only served to show that, in
fact, the Solemnization Statute preferred religion over nonreligious
parallel beliefs.327 The Solemnization Statute’s preference for religion
over comparable secular beliefs, the Seventh Circuit thus concluded,
violated the neutrality principle.328
2.

Neutrality between Religions

Moreover, the Seventh Circuit continued, Indiana’s Solemnization
Statute violated the neutrality principle because it also preferred
certain religions. As an initial matter, the Seventh Circuit stated that
the Solemnization Statute ran afoul of the neutrality principle because
it purported to prefer religions that have clergy as opposed to those
with a different organizational structure as well as religions that accord
“a sacred status to marriage” as opposed to those that see marriage as a
celebration of their values.329 Those distinctions, the Seventh Circuit
explained, are flatly prohibited by the Establishment Clause, which
“clearest command . . . is that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”330 Worse still, deeper analysis of the
325

Id. at 872
Id. at 874
327
Id. at 873-74.
328
Id.
329
Id.
330
Id. (citations omitted).
326
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Solemnization Statute, the court explained, showed that the
Solemnization Statute was more than an attempt to accommodate
religions having clergy and a commitment to marriage. The Statute
picked and chose favorites. Quakers, for example, could solemnize
civil marriages in their own marriage ceremonies by virtue of being
listed in subsection (6) of the Statute, even though they do not have
clergy and “do not treat marriage as a sacrament.”331 This kind of
favoritism, the court rightfully concluded, added to the problem that
that Solemnization Statute already violated the neutrality principle by
preferring religion over parallel secular beliefs.
The Seventh Circuit thus reversed the judgment of the district
court and “remanded with instructions to issue an injunction” allowing
CFI’s secular celebrants “to solemnize marriages in Indiana—to do
this with legal effect, and without risk of criminal penalties.”332
CONCLUSION
In holding that Indiana’s Solemnization Statute violated the
neutrality principle, the Seventh Circuit properly relied on its own as
well as Supreme Court precedent that supports a broad definition of
religion. Given the long standing jurisprudence of the Supreme Court
in defining religion broadly, the Seventh Circuit was correct in
omitting a discussion of precedent that arguably calls for a narrower
definition of religion as that would have threatened to cause confusion
as to the proper test for determining what qualifies as religion for
purposes of First Amendment analysis. In a society that is diversely
rich in religious beliefs, a narrower definition would have put in
jeopardy the religious exercise of many Americans, in turn,
threatening the requirement that the government remains neutral
towards religion. Although the Seventh Circuit also did not discuss a
line of Supreme Court cases that appeared to support the state of
Indiana’s argument that the authority to solemnize a marriage needed
not to be extended to secular entities to comply with the principle of
331
332

Id.
Id. at 875.
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neutrality, those cases did not require a different result. While the
Supreme Court has indeed stated that religious accommodations are
reserved for religious entities and practices, it does not follow that
once a secular set of beliefs qualifies as a religion under the First
Amendment, it can, nevertheless, be denied the accommodation a
government bestows upon traditional religious groups. CFI was thus
entitled to an accommodation under Indiana’s Marriage Solemnization
Statute.
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